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REVIEW ESSAY
PRIVATE PRACTICE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION:
TWO VIEWS OF CORPORATE LAW
BROKEN CONTRACT:

A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL.

By Richard D. Kahlenberg.
Hill and Wang, New York, 1992.
Pp. xiv, 238. $22.00.
A LAWYER'S TALES FROM THE TAKEOVER DECADES.
By Lawrence Lederman.
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1992.
Pp. 358. $24.00.

TOMBSTONES:

Reviewed by Jayne W. Barnard*

Richard Kahlenberg, Harvard Law School class of 1989, recently published a memoir of his career in the law. 1 His thesis is that law schools
generally, and Harvard Law School in particular, admit promising young
college graduates poised to seek justice for the poor. The schools then
methodically extract the idealism from these students, ultimately transforming even the best of them into cookie-cutter graduates who want only to
work for big-city law firms, "toiling for the richest of the rich. " 2 Somehow
Kahlenberg escaped this fate, though he concedes his escape was a narrow
one.
Kahlenberg is the product of a seven-year Harvard education financed,
evidently, by his middle-class family. After rejecting a job offer from Covington & Burling and accepting instead a mid-level staff position with Sen.
Chuck Robb (D-Va.), Kahlenberg apparently believes that he chose the
moral high ground. It is a dubious proposition. Nevertheless, his hypothesis, that law schools offer an "implicit contract" 3 to lead their students
toward a career in public service and then breach that contract by stressing
corporate-oriented coursework, may be worth exploring. I do not intend to
• Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. My thanks to Susan Korzick,
class of 1993, for her research and technical assistance on this essay.
1
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL (1992) [hereinafter BROKEN CONTRACT].
2 /d. at 233.
3 /d. at 237.
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do so in this review. 4 Rather, my purpose is to examine Kahlenberg's perceptions of life after law school and, in particular, his vision of the practice
of corporate law.
Underlying Kahlenberg's thesis about law schools' "breaches of contract"
are three premises one might expect from someone never exposed to a legal
education: (1) corporations and other business enterprises are inherently
immoral; (2) any lawyer who elects to represent the legal interests of a business enterprise is similarly immoral; and (3) any law school that emphasizes
the intellectual tools a lawyer needs to represent the interests of any client,
including a business enterprise, is likewise immoral.
The first premise is grounded in old-fashioned populism;5 the second in
the common but mistaken belief that lawyers necessarily embrace the values
of their clients; 6 and the third in the apparent conviction that a deliberately
ideological legal education, one favoring discussions of justice rather than
"boring" legal rules, 7 would be better than the current freedom-of-choice
model.
4

Note, however, the irony of Kahlenberg's focus on the "practicality" of his law
school training. Most critics attack law schools because so much of today's training
seems so useless. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICHL. REV. 34 (1992) (decrying law schools'
emphasis on abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy).
5
Kahlenberg's mistrust of corporations is not an anomaly. Even today, many Americans believe that organizational wealth is inconsistent with democratic ideals. Recent
manifestations of this anxiety include the Supreme Court's expression of concern about
the "corrosive" influence of corporations over the political process, Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990), and the decision by nine midwestern states to bar non-family corporations from farming within state boundaries because of
the perceived "social and economic evils" that agribusiness corporations represent, MSM
Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 332 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 65 (1991)
(rejecting a corporation's challenge to the Nebraska prohibition and finding it consistent
with both equal protection and due process guarantees).
6 Edward Bennett Williams described this phenomenon as "guilt by client." EVAN
THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMs-ULTIMATE INSIDER,
LEGENDARY TRIAL LAWYER 122 (1991). John W. Davis, founder of Davis, Polk &
Wardwell, offered a spirited response to concerns expressed about guilt by client when he
sought the Democratic nomination for president in 1924. Urged to resign from his firm
to avoid any possibility of contamination by his corporate clients, Davis responded:
Since the law, however, is a profession and not a trade, I conceive it to be the duty of
the lawyer, just as it is the duty of the priest, or the surgeon, to serve those who call
upon him unless indeed there is some insuperable obstacle in the way. No one in all
this list of clients has ever controlled, or fancied that he could control, my personal
or my political conscience. I am vain enough to imagine that no one ever will.
BERYL H. LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? 83 (1961).
7 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 131. In complaining about legal rules,
Kahlenberg picks a particularly sensitive area. Recalling his poverty law course, for
example, he notes "(i]t was not interesting to know that when a rule says you have ten
days to file, you do or do not count the days at both ends." Id. Although it may not be
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In this review, I will resist the temptation to challenge Kahlenberg's pedagogical preferences, but will instead focus on his first and second pointsand his obvious scorn for business enterprises and the lawyers who represent
them.
Kahlenberg dismisses private practice as "amoral at best, immoral at
worst,''8 "lucrative, prestigious, [and] challenging, [but] ultimately unsatisfying."9 His opinion is based primarily on a series of job interviews while he
was still a law student, and his three-month summer internship at Boston's
Ropes & Gray, where he specialized in trusts and estates "because it was
reputed to have the best hours. " 10
In considering Kahlenberg's impressions of the legal profession, it may be
useful to consider the views of a more experienced observer. Consequently,
in this review I will also examine another recent legal memoir, this one written by mergers and acquisitions specialist Lawrence Lederman. 11
Though I will juxtapose the two writers' stories, the books are in fact quite
different. Kahlenberg's is polemical; Lederman's is simply autobiographical.
Each, however, illustrates a carefully constructed personal vision of corporate law and the women and men who practice law. Taken together, the two
books demonstrate how experience can color perception and how insight can
overcome stereotype.
I.

THE OUTSIDER AND THE INSIDER

In his application for admission to Harvard Law School, Rick Kahlenberg
wrote: "Five years from now, I'd like to be pressing civil rights or liberties
questions before the courts." 12 Five years later, he was lobbying Senate colleagues for support of bills like the Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Waste
Management Study Act13 and, during his free time, promoting his book on
radio talk shows. Apparently, Kahlenberg was spending little time in the
presence of, let alone defending the interests of, oppressed people. Meanwhile, young associates at Covington & Burling, the firm whose job offer
Kahlenberg spurned, were serving six-month assignments at Neighborhood
Legal Services offices at the firm's expense, 14 representing Salvadoran nationinteresting, knowing the rules may significantly impact a client's life. See, e.g., Coleman
v. Thompson, Ill S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (refusing to order hearing to consider new evidence
of death-row inmate Roger Coleman's innocence because his pleading had been filed one
day late).
8 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 180.
9 Id. at 5.
10
Id. at 145.
11 LAWRENCE LEDERMAN, TOMBSTONES: A LAWYER'S TALES FROM THE TAKEOVER DECADES (1992) [hereinafter TOMBSTONES).
12 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 3.
13 S. 1089, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
14 See William J. Dean, Neighborhood Legal Services, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 3.
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a1s summarily fired from their suburban landscaping jobs,15 and advancing
food stamp claims for local welfare recipients. 16
Like Rick Kahlenberg, Lawrence Lederman also changed direction early
in his legal career. Setting out to become a law professor, he ended up during the 1980s as a corporate lawyer at powerful Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz. Ultimately, he became a key player in many of the decade's most
intensely contested takeovers, going toe-to-toe with Boone Pickens and
Michael Milken, among others.
With this background, Lederman does not pretend that private practice is
without its dark side. He recounts many all-nighters at the office,l7 concedes
that pro bono work must get done, if at all, after hours, 18 and admits to his
own occasional gamesmanship. 19 If pressed, Lederman would surely concede that law firm practice is often bruising; many lawyers are arrogant and
some are cheats.
Unlike Kahlenberg, however, Lederman can weigh these realities against
some important countervailing considerations: law firm practice can be
exhilarating; 20 transactional lawyering, as well as litigation, can tap one's
most creative and generative talents; 21 lawyers are often instrumental in the
15 See Michelle E. Klass, Alvarado, et a/. v. TLC Services, Inc., et a/., LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1991, at 17.
16 See Michelle E. Klass, Quattlebaum, eta/. v. Dixon, eta/., LEGAL TIMES, July 15,
1991, at 19.
17
TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 44-45, 144-46, 304-07.
18 Id. at 158.
19 E.g., id. at 32 (describing his canny invocation of an obscure contractual provision
to force the renegotiation of an entire contract); id. at 51 (describing his refusal to go
forward with a planned public offering until a corporate executive-who had earlier dismissed him as a low level peon-treated him with respect).
20 In a speech at Harvard Law School in 1920, lawyer Paul Cravath enthused about
his corporate practice this way:
A busy lawyer in New York ... works hard and is always meeting deadlines. But
his life is never dull. He encounters human nature in all its manifold manifestations.
He is in contact with fine minds. His work is spiced with action and variety. The
practice of law itself becomes a mode of life.
"I would rather work twelve hours a day as a lawyer," he avowed, "and go to bed
tired after a day full of interest than to work six dull hours as a stockbroker and have
six hours left for bridge and society."
LEVY, supra note 6, at 90-91.
Harrison Tweed, one of the founders of Milbank Tweed, was even more expansive.
Commenting at a bar association function, Tweed uttered the lines that later became his
epitaph: "[Lawyers] are better to work with or play with or drink with than most other
varieties of mankind." PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EIGHTIES 50 (1982).
21
Skadden, Arps lawyer James Freund notes the distinction between those lawyers
who exercise their creative talents and those who do not:
For want of a better term, I consider myself an activist lawyer-! believe that what a
lawyer does or doesn't do, the initiative he takes or forsakes, can have a significant
impact on the outcome of most matters and transactions; and that accordingly, the
practitioner must at all times be alert, reach out and accomplish. There are also a
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success of growing businesses; and most lawyers forge significant, enduring
human connections with both their clients and co-workers.
Kahlenberg sees a much narrower vision. Replaying familiar attacks on
contemporary lawyers, 22 he seems to believe that corporate lawyers are nothing more than highly paid plumbers whose success is dependent on their
ability to make connections and who spend their careers knee-deep in other
peoples' shit.
In fact, however, most corporate lawyers engage in a far more complex
and rewarding relationship with their work than Kahlenberg can even imagine. The most effective corporate lawyers do not confuse their identities with
those of their corporate clients. 23 They do not spend every waking hour
conjuring ways to "[make] the world safe for Morgan Guaranty." 24 Rather,
the best corporate lawyers are polymorphic operators deploying a wide
range of intellectual and social skills, coordinating complex movements of
people and materials, and ministering to the emotional needs of their clients.
Most corporate lawyers are not dissatisfied with their work, 25 and most of
them-properly-regard that work as socially valuable. 26
A.

Kahlenberg's Story

Kahlenberg asks "how is it that so many students can enter law school
determined to use law to promote liberal ideals and leave three years later to
counsel the least socially progressive elements of our society?"27 He quickly
great number of highly professional attorneys who take a Jess expansive, more reflective view of lawyering-and who nonetheless manage to accomplish much of value.
The breed of lawyers, however, for whom I have little regard treat their practice as
nothing more than reacting to external stimuli; ask me a specific question and I'll
give you an even more specific answer ....
JAMES C. FREUND, LAWYERING: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO LEGAL PRACTICE 3
(1979).
22 See, e.g., Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J.L. Eouc.
570, 573 (1983) ("[F]ar too many ... individuals are becoming lawyers at a time when
the country cries out for more talented business executives, more enlightened public servants, more inventive engineers, more able high school principals and teachers.").
23 See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 249 (1988) (reporting results of a study that suggests
that corporate lawyers, by and large, are more "liberal" than the clients they represent).
24
BROKEN CoNTRACT, supra note 1, at 201.
25 See infra note 91. In a poll sponsored by the National Law Journal in May of 1990,
79% of the respondents reported they were satisfied with their careers as lawyers. Margaret C. Fisk, Lawyers Give Thumbs Up, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1990, at S2. In an informal
"quality of life" poll conducted among Virginia lawyers in 1992, 68% of the respondents
reported they were "totally" or "reasonably" satisfied with their careers. Donna Childress, Fax Poll: Two-Thirds of Lawyers Satisfied, 6 VA. LAW. WKLY. 1061, 1061 (1992).
26 See, e.g., BROKEN CoNTRACT, supra note 1, at 41 (reporting a study in which
"[s]ixty-seven percent of [Harvard Law graduates] believed they were contributing to the
public good").
27 /d. at 5. For a thoughtful approach to answering this question, see ROBERT GRAN-
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rejects the notion that social idealism is nothing more than a phase through
which most college students pass on their way to a more opportunistic view
of the world. 28 He also discounts explanations based solely on economics,
observing-as if it were an adequate response-that Harvard (unlike most
law schools) has a loan forgiveness program for graduates entering public
interest practice. 29 In the end, Kahlenberg concludes that "the most important reasons that liberal law students [go] into corporate law [are] power,
prestige, and convention. " 30
Unfortunately, Kahlenberg minimizes other common reasons law students reject an exclusively public service practice, even though he admits
they were important considerations in his own career choice. For example,
Kahlenberg quit Harvard's Legal Aid Bureau before even starting because
"[he] wasn't very good at the public speaking which litigation requires. Nor
did [he] enjoy it. In addition, [he] had come to realize that poverty law was
essentially social work and, as such, couldn't change the world .... " 31 He
also rejected a career as a prosecutor because, rather than addressing underlying social ills, he "could only try one case at a time." 32
More importantly, Kahlenberg found that he lacked the "level of professional dedication" required of a full-time public interest lawyer. 33 "[D]oing
anonymous legal-services work in the ghetto while swimming in debt" 34 did
not appeal to him, nor did the prospect of working for Ralph Nader at
$18,000 a year. 35 In addition, "public interest jobs just didn't distinguish
you the way the high-salaried firms did." 36 Indeed, Kahlenberg's choices
FIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992)
(tracing development of law students' attitudes and values-their "moral transformation"-through the law school experience); ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND
BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL
(1989) (examining the law school socialization process).
28 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 6.
29

Id.

30 ld. at 7. This conclusion is not original. See CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND
ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALIST AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 232 (1991) (recognizing that most law students choose private practice for its "high pay, considerable prestige, and great expectations"). By disparaging the motivations of young lawyers who
select private practice, Kahlenberg seems to imply that "power, prestige, and convention" play no role in a public interest job search. He later acknowledges, however, that,
"even in the egalitarian world of public-interest law, there [are] widely acknowledged
pecking orders." BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 37. Kahlenberg, himself,
accepted a summer job in the Manhattan U.S. Attorney's office after he was advised that
it was a "resume builder." Id.
31 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 73-74.
32 Id. at 68.
33 Id. at 74.
34 Id. at 233.
35 Id. at 101.
36 Id. at 4.
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were limited, especially considering his stated unwillingness to put in long
hours37 coupled with his desire to own waterfront property. 38
In his third year, Kahlenberg mercifully recognized what is quickly obvious to his readers: he should not have gone to law school. "[M]ore interested in policy than law," 39 Kahlenberg should probably have attended the
Kennedy School of Government with his wife or sought meaningful work
instead. In any event, Kahlenberg's decision to skip the bar exam to finish
his book, pillorying his classmates who had more carefully chosen their
graduate education, now seems largely gratuitous. It is, at the very least,
evidence of his immaturity.
When Kahlenberg is fifty, this book will probably embarrass him, not
because it is poorly written-it is, in fact, quite lively40-but because it will
so painfully remind him of a time in his life when everything seemed so
simple, and everyone wore only one hat, black or white. 41

B. Lederman's Story
Lederman's book, unlike Kahlenberg's, does not claim to carry the weight
of a thesis. Instead, Lederman merely traces his professional development
from law school at New York University through his successful years at
Wachtell, Lipton. 42
Following a clerkship with California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, Lederman joined Cravath, Swaine & Moore in November 1967. The product of a
middle-class background, an admitted "stranger to corporate America," 43
Lederman nevertheless joined Cravath's well-manicured corporate department. Upon his arrival, he was assigned first to senior partner Frank Ran37

See supra text accompanying note 10. In fairness, one must note that, during law
school, Kahlenberg seems to have been a very compulsive worker--diligently studygrouping, conducting nationwide interviews for his seminar papers, interviewing for jobs,
and compiling notes for his book.
38 See BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note l, at 104-05 (revealing Kahlenberg's desire to
provide his wife with a house on the waterfront).
39
/d. at 180.
4
Kahlenberg is at his best when he describes the vanities of his law professors and
fellow students. Consider, for example, the following portrayal of Professor Martha
Minow:
[T]hroughout the semester, Minow labored mightily to be hip. She would read
poetry, make references to Freud, and begin many classes by asking if anyone had
seen a good movie. She generally acted as if she was our friend, even though she was
one of the few professors never to learn our names.
/d. at 52.
41 How much better this book might have been with 10 years of perspective-as well
as Harvardian grace-behind it! Cf. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON?
TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK (1991).
42 Lederman currently heads the corporate practice at New York's Milbank, Tweed,
Hadley & McCloy.
43
TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 8.

°
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dolph and then, after two years, to another partner, William Marshall.
Lederman learned important lessons from both men. 44
Ultimately satisfied that he could handle corporate transactions on his
own-and perhaps convinced that partnership was unlikely-Lederman left
Cravath in 1975 for upstart, and then unchic, Wachtell, Lipton. His career
at the firm began with conventional buy-and-sell transactions, but Lederman
quickly progressed to the heart of the emerging takeover market. In the
early years, Lederman represented raiders as well as targets. Eventually,
however, he found himself primarily acting on the defense side of the takeover equation.
Given the choice, Lederman says, he would have preferred representing
raiders, 45 whom he regards as "creative people pursuing personal visions." 46
However, Marty Lipton increasingly marketed his firm as a defense boutique, and Lederman came to recognize a less attractive side of the raider
mentality:
[T]he game aspect of the raider's side sometimes elevated keeping score
and beating your opponent above thinking about what the fighting was
over. Among corporate executives making or contemplating their first
hostile acquisition there was often a locker-room mentality. I found
that all the mystery and excitement of sex, of breaking down resistance,
of scoring and conquest, were associated with a takeover. Manliness
was at stake, and measured. 47
He also came to empathize with the very real pain of his management clients: "I have never seen so many businessmen touch each other as in the
44
Exposed to two quite different personalities, Lederman quickly discovered that style
didn't always equate with success.
[Randolph], in mid-life, was everything a Cravath partner shouldn't be. He was
undisciplined, eccentric, and often bored with what he was doing. Recently divorced
and courting the woman who would become his wife, he was unavailable for evening
work. Moreover, after his father's demise he was unquestionably rich and, by
Cravath standards, a playboy.
/d. at 22-23. Marshall, on the other hand, was Randolph's "polar opposite: ... the most
disciplined, careful, precise, and hardworking lawyer in the firm." /d. at 34. "He was an
indefatigable worker, and worked as late as he had to, often without eating, to get the
work done. He would regularly stay at the office until two or three in the morning ....
Many days he would work around the clock .... " /d. at 41. Marshall was also uncompromising and often tyrannical. At times, these qualities prevented Marshall from serving as an effective advocate for his clients. See id. at 44-45.
45
/d. at 108.
46 /d. at 78. One critic of takeovers takes a somewhat different view. See JEFF
MAD RICK, TAKING AMERICA: HOW WE GOT FROM THE fiRST HOSTILE TAKEOVER
TO MEGAMERGERS, CORPORATE RAIDING AND SCANDAL 4 ( 1987) ("Most of those who
drove mergers in the 1970s and 1980s were money men. They were rarely dreamers, or
builders, or even men who could run a business. They were men who wanted, and knew
how to make, money.").
47 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 109.

HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 128 1993

1993]

PRIVATE PRACTICE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION

129

beginning of a tender offer, radiating warmth, camaraderie, and reassurance.
Taboos about expressing feelings were set aside, overcome by the threat of
loss of position, the imminent collapse of an ordered world. " 48
Ultimately, Lederman became a skilled defense tactician, structuring successful management buyouts, developing unorthodox recapitalization techniques, and perfecting, as a last resort, the auction process in which
incumbent managers sold their companies to the highest bidder. He also
logged pro bono time, serving as special counsel to Phoenix House, a New
York City drug rehabilitation project. 49
While at Wachtell, Lipton, Lederman came to appreciate the intimacy of
a small, cohesive practice group. Describing the relationship much as one
might describe a successful marriage, Lederman recalls that the "members
of the firm trusted each other's judgment in all working matters" and used
an abbreviated language, "a shorthand that was almost a code."50 However,
Lederman also encountered betrayal in this familial setting. When Ilan
Reich, a young partner Lederman had befriended, was caught in an insider
trading scheme with investment banker Dennis Levine, 51 Lederman was devastated. 52 Thereafter, Lederman often considered whether Wachtell, Lipton's emphasis on wealth and success had hastened Reich's-and others'moral derailment. 53
In the end, Lederman left Wachtell, Lipton, apparently because his partners disapproved of the disclosures in this book. 54 There is little in his book,
however, to find objectionable. Although Lederman's writing is unevensome chapters are fluid and filled with human energy while others read like
factual summaries in a legal brief-overall the book is both engaging and
instructive. Lederman clearly found meaning and satisfaction in his decades
of corporate practice. He hardly considers himself just a "droneD to wealthy
clients," 55 driven by ambition and greed.
II.

TWO WRITERS' PERCEPTIONS OF A LIFE IN CORPORATE LAW

Kahlenberg and Lederman understandably take very different views of the
practice of law, both as they describe representative clients and as they
describe representative lawyers. The differences are more than generational.
For example, Kahlenberg portrays corporate clients as faceless banks and
drug companies. Lederman, by contrast, savors the complexities of the
48

Id. at 124.

49

/d. at 156-66.
/d. at 249.
51 DENNIS B. LEVINE, INSIDE OUT: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF WALL STREET
(1991) (recounting the role of llan Reich as one source of Levine's inside information).
52 TOMBSTONES, supra note ll, at 245.
53 Id. at 249.
54 See Chris Goodrich, In Brief, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, Book Review, at 6.
55 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 44.
50
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human beings who are his real clients. Consider these portraits of two of
Lederman's favorites:
[Thomas Mellon Evans, CEO of H.K. Porter] was restless and
mercurial, often scowling, engaged in projects that made him too busy
on some days to get a haircut, and willing to eat sawdust-tasting sandwiches on his plane in order to pack two days of work into one. 56
Bill Stokley III [CEO of Stokley-Van Camp] was short and compact,
built to last. . . . [In researching ways to sell the company's Gatorade
product, he] became knowledgeable about dieting and exercise
trends. . . . Being sensitive to youthful aspirations, he shared them,
which dispelled the stodginess that often seems to come with middle age
and running a large business. 57
More interesting, perhaps, than their differing perceptions of corporate
clients are the two writers' very different perceptions of corporate lawyers.
Listen as Kahlenberg describes his job interview with a Skadden, Arps partner, one of the many "Neanderthal corporate slaves" 58 he encountered during his job-seeking marathon:
His pep talk was all about "can-do," "hustle," "doing deals," and legal
"entrepreneurship." He bragged that Skadden was the first American
firm in Tokyo and that his work enabled him to travel at least two days
a week. He said the leisurely three-hour lunch would be the downfall of
the old-line firms and generally reveled in the crazy, unpredictable
hours, trying to tum what might, to the untutored ear, be a fatal drawback into a convincing reason to practice at Skadden. I feigned interest,
even though part of what I wanted from a law firm was a relaxed, genteel, pipe-smoking atmosphere. If you were going to be a rich lawyer,
you wanted to have more dignity than a traveling salesman. 59
In contrast, consider Lederman's description of the way Frank Randolph,
his first mentor at Cravath, approached the documentation of a complex
corporate deal and shared his strategic thinking with Lederman, then an
impressionable young associate:
Frank was clever in handling the documentation. All lawyers are
eager to prepare the papers, but Frank would usually let the other side
do the first draft, which freed him to work on more than one or two
deals at a time. That reversed the conventional wisdom that it's better
to be the draftsman, for it is often thought that the hand that wields the
pen controls the nuances of the transaction. Frank would comment,
counterpunch as it were, telling me that you have to learn how to read
closely as well as write closely.
56 TOMBSTONES,
57

supra note 11, at 77.

/d. at 189.

58 BROKEN CoNTRACT,
59

supra note 1, at 101.

/d. at 105.
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There were two elements to look for in any draft: one was its accuracy in reflecting the deal, and the other, its omissions. The difficult
part was to find what had been left out. Frank would start with "what
if" and then go through the structure of the draft and see how it
worked. For example, he would ask if United Fruit [Cravath's client]
had to sell its subsidiary under [a sales] contract with RCA if it didn't
get satisfactory regulatory approval. It might be possible to have to pay
damages for failing to sell even though United Fruit wasn't permitted
legally to sell. That would not be a happy result. The process of asking
questions was like playing pinball. He'd run the ball through the maze
and see what lit up and what didn't. He would spin ten or fifteen balls
through with me, and the agreement would start to take on shape, then
three dimensions and life. When its inadequacies showed, he asked the
inevitable question: Could we layer on another level of complexity to
account for the omissions? Of course. 60
Kahlenberg might regard this passage as supportive of his claim that a
corporate law practice is "intellectually challenging, but in the same way as
a crossword puzzle, with no greater social importance. " 61 If so, he would
confuse metaphor with meaning. As Lederman recognizes, deal making
involves far more than mere gamesmanship. Most corporate transactions
have important and foreseeable human consequences.
Frank Randolph knew, for example, that United Fruit had to sell its telecommunications subsidiary before the company's licenses to operate expired.
Because of the intense governmental hostility toward United Fruit at the
time, without the sale, the licenses would likely not have been renewed and
the operation would have been closed down. 62 Hundreds of jobs would be
lost.
Years later, in another transaction, both Lederman and his clients understood that launching a management buyout bid for Stokley-Van Camp
presented risks for its CEO. Once Bill Stokley, whose great-grandmother
had founded the business in 1898, offered $55 per share, outside counterbidders could buy the company simply by besting his offer. In fact, Quaker
Oats eventually bought the company at $77 per share, extinguishing
Stokley's birthright. 63
Unlike problems posed in law school, neither of these transactions was a
hypothetical exercise. Indeed, both transactions involved the classic dramatic values-hubris, tension, and resolution.
Kahlenberg is also mistaken when he assumes a corporate legal practice
deals exclusively with "the battle between (mostly) rich stockholders and
rich managers. " 64 The practice of corporate law impacts every corporate
60 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 28.
61 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 220.
62 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 24.
63

/d. at 201.

64 BROKEN CONTRACT,

supra note 1, at 130. Many shareholders are by no means

HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 131 1993

132

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:121

constituency. Moreover, law firms often have a direct impact on people who
have no relationship with the firms' corporate clients, not only through the
pro bono efforts of their litigation departments65 but also through the efforts
of their transactionallawyers. 66 Many corporate transactions produce unexpected social benefits. Lederman recounts, for example, one unintended
consequence of his 1985 recapitalization of Multimedia, Inc., in which a
$350 million disbursement to Multimedia shareholders generated the funding for the establishment of a fine arts center in Greenville, South Carolina,
by a group of the founder's heirs. 67
Although Multimedia involved an extraordinary transaction, every time
corporate lawyers complete even the simplest deal, people's lives may be
affected. Taking a company public, for example, may generate new jobs and
products. 68 Corporate mergers may also result in new jobs. 69 Establishing a
pension plan enhances workers' retirements while indirectly accomplishing
other corporate goals. 70 Even selling moribund operating units may infuse
them with new life and energy. 71
Clearly, however, not every corporate deal has such positive or even
rich. In fact, one in four adult Americans now own equity securities, either directly or
through a mutual fund. N.Y.S.E. FACT BooK 71 (1991). Of these owners, 15% have an
annual household income of $25,000 or less. Id. at 72.
65
See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1966) (recounting Abe Fortas's
representation of Clarence Earl Gideon that culminated in the Supreme Court's reversal
of a long-standing precedent concerning an indigent's right to counsel in criminal cases);
GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO MINE CREEK DISASTER (1976) (describing the effort
by a team of lawyers at Arnold & Porter to help survivors of a ruinous flood to recover
$13.5 million in damages from the mining company that had caused the flood).
66 See Daniel Wise, New York Lawyers for Public Interest: 15 Years of Obtaining Counsel, N.Y. L.J., Nov. l, 1991, at 1 (describing the pro bono activities of several law firm
corporate departments, including counseling non-profit organizations on corporate, tax,
real estate, and, occasionally, bankruptcy issues). "One new initiative on the non-litigation side has been to link three firms-Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison;
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; and Weil Gotshal & Manges-with parent groups in
East Harlem, the Bronx and Williamsburg seeking to better conditions in their children's
schools." Id.
67 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 208.
68 See, e.g., John S.R. Shad, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Going Public, in
WHY, WHEN AND How TO Go PUBLIC 26-28 (G. Scott Hutchison ed., 1970) (outlining
the organizational and management benefits of going public).
69 See, e.g., Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on
Labor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 23 (Alan J. Auerbach
ed., 1988) (estimating that in simple consensual company sales, post-sale employment
goes up approximately nine percent).
70 See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (1989) (upholding corporation's use of employee stock option plan as an antitakeover device).
71 See, e.g., GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT 175 (1992) (describing the success of Duracell after Kraft sold the company: "Duracell's sales soared; its market share
climbed; it was a success story by any yardstick.").
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benign social consequences. Corporate mergers, acquisitions, and buyouts
may also eliminate jobs and even destroy companies. 72 What Kahlenberg
and others misunderstand, however, is that in the end it is clients, not their
lawyers, who create the deals and it is clients, not their lawyers, who alone
are accountable for the consequences. This lesson, equally applicable to
deals that fail as it is to deals that succeed, is illustrated by Lederman's
account of his efforts to negotiate the sale to IBM of a corporate client,
Neotec, a small, high-tech start-up firm. Although IBM's infusion of cash
was essential to Neotec's survival and the negotiations had been successfully
concluded, IBM aborted the deal at the eleventh hour. IBM's lawyer-a
comer-office partner at Cravath-was mortified. Only after this experience
could Lederman fully appreciate "that no matter how powerful a lawyer
may be, he cannot commit to deliver his client. The lawyer advises and the
client decides." 73
Finally, like many writers before him, Kahlenberg focuses on lawyerly
greed. Throughout history, critics have often castigated lawyers for their
desire and ability to make money from the woes of others. 74 In recent years,
fictional best-sellers have frequently turned on the characterization of lawyers as money-crazed yuppies. 75 Apparently, readers enjoy seeing lawyers
72 See, e.g., ANTHONY F. BUONO & JAMES L. BOWDITCH, THE HUMAN SIDE OF
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 3-6, 12 (1989) (estimating that 10% of the American
workforce was affected in some way by the mergers and acquisitions activity of the 1980s:
tens of thousands of employees lost their jobs, and even those who did not lose their jobs
experienced increased stress, anxiety, and resentment); Dwight Harshbarger, Mergers,
Acquisitions, and the Reformatting of American Business, in THE HUMAN SIDE OF CoRPORATE COMPETITIVENESS 108 (Daniel Fishman & Cary Cherniss eds., 1990) ("Following acquisitions during the period from 1981 to 1986, 500,000 executives lost jobs they
had held for more than three years. 30% of them were still unemployed two years later.
Among blue-collar workers approximately 34% were unemployed two years after the
acquisition.").
73
TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 71.
74
Lawyers are plants that will grow in any soil that is cultivated by the hands of
others, and when once they have taken root they will extinguish every vegetable that
grows around them. The most ignorant, the most bungling member of that profession will, if placed in the most obscure part of the country, promote litigiousness and
amass more wealth than the most opulent farmer with all his toil .... What a pity
that our forefathers, who happily extinguished so many fatal customs and expunged
from their new government so many errors and abuses both religious and civil, did
not prevent the introduction of a set of men so dangerous.
JESS M. BRALLIER, LAWYERS AND OTHER REPTILES 23 (1992) (quoting H. St. John
Crevecoeur, 1787).
75
See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM 9 (Dell Paperback 1991) (describing how a
promising young law school graduate-Harvard, of course-is unwittingly lured into the
Mafia simply because its "front," an attractive Memphis law firm, offers" '[a] base salary
of eighty thousand the first year, plus bonuses. Eighty-five the second year, plus bonuses.
A low-interest mortgage so you can buy a home. Two country club memberships. And a
new BMW. You pick the color, of course.'").
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portrayed as avaricious cynics. 76 The public does not buy and seldom reads
serious chronicles like Lederman's, or those of James Stewart77 or Steven
BrilF8-men who write with obvious affection for the honorable, yet fallible,
people who practice corporate law.
Unlike Kahlenberg, these men focus on the reality, rather than the
mythology, of private practice. Writing as cultural historians, as well as
journalists, they explore the increasingly complex challenges faced by the
legal profession rather than fixating on some undergraduate notion of how
lawyers might better behave in a market-free, stress-free world.

III.

PRIVATE PRACTICE IN A MARKET-DRIVEN, STRESS-LADEN WORLD

It is unfortunate that Rick Kahlenberg chose the late 1980s to take his
peek into the legal profession because during this period some lawyers, like
many other professionals, often found themselves sacrificing both decorum
and professional ethics in their quest for increased wealth. 79 Not surprisingly, complaints of professional misconduct increased during this period80
as did the number of disputes over fees. 81 Most lawyers, however, struggled
76

Currently enjoying enormous success, The Firm offers a remarkably dark depiction
of the legal profession:
"When you were in law school you had some noble idea of what a lawyer should be.
A champion of individual rights, a defender of the Constitution; a guardian of the
oppressed; an advocate for your client's principles. Then after you practice for six
months you realize we're nothing but hired guns. Mouthpieces for sale to the highest bidder, available to anybody, any crook, any sleazebag with enough money to pay
our outrageous fees. Nothing shocks you. It's supposed to be an honorable profession, but you'll meet so many crooked lawyers you'll want to quit and find an honest
job. Yeah, Mitch, you'll get cynical. And it's sad, really."
Jd. at 68-69.
77 JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERs-INSIDE AMERICA'S MosT POWERFUL LAW
FIRMS (1983) (chronicling the role of lawyers in high-profile lawsuits and other major
matters occurring in 1980, including the Chrysler bail out, Genentech's initial public
offering, and the resolution of claims by Iran against American banks, which was a condition precedent for the release of American hostages).
78
STEVEN BRILL, TRIAL BY JURY (1989) (reprinting the best stories and profiles from
The American Lawyer for the period 1983 to 1988).
79
See, e.g., STEVEN J. KUMBLE & KEVIN J. LA HART, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE
RISE AND RUIN OF FINLEY, KUMBLE (1990) (recounting how greed, power-lust, and
unbridled self-enrichment led to the demise of the first national law firm in 1987).
80 See Margaret C. Fisk, The Year in Review: 1990 Was a Year of Uncertainty for the
Profession, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 7, 1991, at S2 (discussing firms' recent accountability for the
practices of the 1980s, including the siphoning of money from judgments scheduled for
victims and the filing of frivolous claims).
81 See, e.g., ·~ .. In the Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of
Lawyer Professionalism: Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Governors and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243, 283
(1986) (citing fees as a major source of criticism and misunderstanding between attorneys
and their clients).
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to reposition themselves during the 1980s-trying to compete in a contracting marketplace while continuing to uphold the ethical traditions of
their profession. They did so, for the most part, by working harder than
ever. 82
Today, as a consequence, many lawyers find themselves stretched to their
emotional limits. Associates complain of inhumane working conditions;83
partners lament a decline in civility. 84 Recent graduates often regret their
career choice85 and many more experienced lawyers are fleeing the profession altogether. 86 Reflecting a widespread sense of malaise among lawyers, a
recent Johns Hopkins study showed lawyers topping the list of professionals
most likely to suffer from depression. 87
The fact is, the private practice of law has become as grueling a business
as electoral politics-not, as Kahlenberg believes, because it is morally suspect, but because it has become economically inefficient. In a 1990 survey of
members of the American Bar Association, about half of the lawyers in private practice said they no longer have enough time for themselves or their
families. 86 Nearly three-quarters said they regularly felt exhausted and
"worn out" by the end of the workday. 89
The human cost of this transformation has been substantial:
82

See The State of the Legal Profession 1990, 1991 A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIVISION 23
[hereinafter The State of the Legal Profession] (presenting survey results indicating that
lawyers worked much longer hours in 1990 than in 1984).
83 See At the Breaking Point: A National Conference on the Emerging Crisis in the
Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives-Its Impact on Law Firms and Client Services, 1991
A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIVISION l (reporting a survey that demonstrates the negative
effect that the deteriorating work environment has on associates' mental and physical
well-being).
84 See COMMITIEE ON CIVILITY, SEVENTH FED. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, INTERIM
REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 16-22 (1991) (describing aggressive litigation practices and a deterioration of professional courtesies within the three-state circuit).
85 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1991)
(discussing the disillusioning difference between law school and legal practice and observing that former law students who return to their law schools and chat with professors
"would rather discuss the prospect of leaving their large firms for academia or smaller
firms than discuss the current students they are trying to recruit").
86 See generally DEBORAH L. ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW: WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE GETIING OUT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2d ed. 1991) (featuring interviews
with attorneys who have quit practicing law and offering career tips for lawyers seeking
to leave the legal profession).
87 William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1081 (1990) (finding that lawyers "have decidedly
higher levels of depression than the 3% to 5% found ... among the general population").
88
The State of the Legal Profession, supra note 82, at 17.
89 /d. at 24.
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A 1990 survey of New Jersey lawyers revealed that 23 percent [of
respondents] plan to leave the practice before they retire; in Maryland,
nearly one-third of lawyers surveyed by the state bar association in 1988
said they were not sure whether they wanted to continue practicing law;
and 23 percent of North Carolina lawyers responding to a 1990 survey
told their bar association they would not become attorneys again. 90
In short, although private practice retains many attractive features, 91 it
has become an increasingly punishing way to make a living. It is understandable that a student like Rick Kahlenberg chose not to pursue this
career path; what is less forgivable is that he has no compassion for those
who, for motives as legitimate as his, chose otherwise.
CONCLUSION

Rick Kahlenberg has a keen sense for other peoples' weaknesses; unfortunately, however, he is less insightful into his own. He is utterly oblivious to
the irony of a career choice that regards backroom politics for an ambitious
first-term Senator as morally superior to any work that a well-trained corporate lawyer might perform.
Kahlenberg's narrow vision of the practice of law is what one might
expect from a person with his limited perspective. Lawrence Lederman once
shared a similar view when, during his first day at Cravath, he worried that
"everything at the firm seemed more routine and less challenging than [he]
thought it would be. " 92 Lederman now recognizes the error of his early
judgment: "I should have understood that the reality of the institution is
90 Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer Hours Here To Stay? Quality Time Losing Out, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 1993, at 62, 62. It should be noted, however, that escapist attitudes are not
unique to lawyers. See, e.g., Working Conditions: Survey of Texas Teachers Shows Higher
Level of Dissatisfaction, 28 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1366, at 679 (May 28,
1990) (discussing a survey of teachers in Texas showing that 45.1% are considering leaving the profession); Ethan Bronner, Survey Finds Lawyers Are Generally Happy with
Their Careers, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1990, at 3 (presenting results of recent poll
indicating that 40% of surveyed physicians would probably or definitely not enter medical school if they had to do it all over again); Amy Goldstein, Veteran Teachers Give
Rookies Lesson in Reality, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1990, at B1 ("Nationally, half of all
new teachers quit within five years."). In addition, although some observers have predicted that "so many lawyers [are] disgruntled that a mass exodus from the profession [is]
imminent," only nine percent of the attorneys participating in a recent survey indicated a
clear intent to leave the profession. Fisk, supra note 25, at S2.
91 In the 1990 ABA survey, 91% of the respondents agreed with the statement that "I
am respected and treated as a colleague by my superiors;" 90% agreed that "the intellectual challenge of my work is great;" 88% believed that their work atmosphere was
"warm and personal;" 82% that "the opportunity for professional development is very
good;" 74% that "I have considerable control over the selection of cases/matters that I
handle;" and 72% that "political intrigue and backbiting is almost nonexistent" in the
law firm setting. The State of the Legal Profession, supra note 82, at 17-20.
92 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 21.
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often not the image that it projects for itself and that it couldn't be understood in a short time." 93 That lesson applies to firms like Cravath even
today.
A corporate law practice is seldom the contentious battleground, the
cathedral of greed, or even the paperwork wasteland it often appears to be to
the uninitiated. It is hardly, as Kahlenberg suggests, the evil empire.
Instead, corporate practice is an evolving, and very human, phenomenon.
Just as Lawrence Lederman no longer defends against many hostile takeovers these days, corporate law firms no longer dominate docile clients, suppress inter-firm competition for rainmakers, or attempt to influence judges
the way they did just a few years ago. Instead, firms are struggling to find
ways to make their lawyers' lives more liveable while still serving the needs
of equally stressed clients in a complex, electronically interconnected, global
marketplace. These efforts deserve some credit, especially from self-styled
liberals.
Today's corporate lawyers need thoughtful discussion about integrating
personal and professional obligations into their everyday practice. They
don't need more sermons from sanctimonious bystanders about the moral
depravity of their profession.

93

/d.
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